Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block rewards. We analyze some of the incentive compatibility issues that arise from transaction fees, which relate to the bids that users submit, the allocation rules that miners use to choose which transactions to include, and where they choose to mine in the context of longest-chain consensus. We start by surveying a variety of mining attacks including undercutting, fee sniping, and fee-optimized selfish mining. Then, we move to analyzing mechanistic notions of user incentive compatibility, myopic miner incentive compatibility, and off-chain-agreement-proofness, as well as why they are provably incompatible in their full form. Then, we discuss weaker notions of nearly and $\gamma$-weak incentive compatibility, and how all of these forms of incentive compatibility hold or fail in the trustless auctioneer setup of blockchains, examining classical mechanisms as well as more recent ones such as Ethereum's EIP-1559 mechanism and \cite{chung}'s burning second-price auction. Throughout, we generalize and interrelate existing notions, provide new unifying perspectives and intuitions on analysis, and discuss both specific and overarching open problems for future work.
翻译:作为激励加工交易的一种方式,许多链锁系统交易费是激励加工交易的一种重要激励手段。 不幸的是,它们也引入了与固定板块奖励等替代物相比的巨大激励不对称。我们分析了交易费产生的一些激励兼容性问题,这些问题涉及用户提交的投标,矿工用来选择哪些交易包括哪些交易的分配规则,以及他们选择在最长期的链共识背景下开采的问题。我们从调查各种采矿袭击开始,包括切割、收费抽取和费用优化的自私采矿。然后,我们着手分析用户激励兼容性、近似矿工奖励兼容性以及链外协议互不兼容的机械化概念,以及为什么交易费完全不兼容。然后,我们讨论几乎和$$gamma-$weak奖励兼容性等较弱的概念,以及所有这些形式的激励兼容性如何在无信任拍卖链设置中持续或失败,审查古典机制,以及诸如Eieum的EIP-1559机制和\citelop minement murations Profloverial Proversal and the loseal laversal and the laview laviews.