Spectre intrusions exploit speculative execution design vulnerabilities in modern processors. The attacks violate the principles of isolation in programs to gain unauthorized private user information. Current state-of-the-art detection techniques utilize micro-architectural features or vulnerable speculative code to detect these threats. However, these techniques are insufficient as Spectre attacks have proven to be more stealthy with recently discovered variants that bypass current mitigation mechanisms. Side-channels generate distinct patterns in processor cache, and sensitive information leakage is dependent on source code vulnerable to Spectre attacks, where an adversary uses these vulnerabilities, such as branch prediction, which causes a data breach. Previous studies predominantly approach the detection of Spectre attacks using the microarchitectural analysis, a reactive approach. Hence, in this paper, we present the first comprehensive evaluation of static and microarchitectural analysis-assisted machine learning approaches to detect Spectre vulnerable code snippets (preventive) and Spectre attacks (reactive). We evaluate the performance trade-offs in employing classifiers for detecting Spectre vulnerabilities and attacks.
翻译:攻击违反了程序隔离原则,以获取未经授权的私人用户信息。目前最先进的探测技术利用微结构特征或脆弱的投机代码来检测这些威胁。然而,这些技术还不够,因为光谱攻击被证明与最近发现的绕过现有减缓机制的变异体更加隐形。侧通道产生不同的处理器缓存模式,敏感信息泄漏取决于易受光谱攻击的来源代码,敌人利用这些弱点,如分支预测,造成数据失密。先前的研究主要是利用微结构构造分析,即反应式的方法,探测Spectre攻击。因此,在本论文中,我们介绍对静态和微观结构分析辅助机器学习方法的首次全面评估,以探测易受光谱代码断层(预防性)和频谱攻击(反应性)的发现方法。我们评估了在使用分类器探测频谱弱点和攻击方面的绩效权衡。