We study the temporal dynamics of potentially harmful apps (PHAs) on Android by leveraging 8.8M daily on-device detections collected among 11.7M customers of a popular mobile security product between 2019 and 2020. We show that the current security model of Android, which limits security products to run as regular apps and prevents them from automatically removing malicious apps opens a significant window of opportunity for attackers. Such apps warn users about the newly discovered threats, but users do not promptly act on this information, allowing PHAs to persist on their device for an average of 24 days after they are detected. We also find that while app markets remove PHAs after these become known, there is a significant delay between when PHAs are identified and when they are removed: PHAs persist on Google Play for 77 days on average and 34 days on third party marketplaces. Finally, we find evidence of PHAs migrating to other marketplaces after being removed on the original one. This paper provides an unprecedented view of the Android PHA landscape, showing that current defenses against PHAs on Android are not as effective as commonly thought, and identifying multiple research directions that the security community should pursue, from orchestrating more effective PHA takedowns to devising better alerts for mobile security products.
翻译:我们通过利用2019年至2020年之间在11.7M用户中收集的流行移动安全产品11.7M客户中收集的每天8.8M次安装检测设备,对Android的潜在有害应用软件(PHAs)的时间动态进行了研究。我们发现,目前Android的安全模型限制了安全产品作为常规应用运行,防止它们自动去除恶意应用软件,这为攻击者打开了一个重要的机会之窗。这种软件提醒用户注意新发现的威胁,但用户并没有迅速采取行动,允许PHAs在发现信息后平均24天内坚持在设备上。我们还发现,虽然软件市场在发现PHAs之后清除了PHAs,但在确定PHAs的身份时和被删除时之间出现了很大的延迟:PHAs在谷歌上持续平均77天,在第三方市场上持续34天。最后,我们发现了PHAs在被删除后迁移到其他市场的证据。本文对Android PHA的景象作了前所未有的观察,表明目前对Android的防御手段并不有效,我们通常认为,但从PHAHASDRE进行更多的安全搜索,并找出更好的安全方向。