Sharding, i.e. splitting the miners or validators to form and run several subchains in parallel, is known as one of the main solutions to scalability problems of blockchains. The drawback is that as the number of miners expanding each subchain becomes small, it becomes vulnerable to security attacks. To solve this problem, a framework, named as \textit{Ployshard}, has been proposed in which each validator verifies a coded combination of the blocks introduced by different subchains, thus helping to protect the security of all subchains. In this paper, we introduce an attack on Ployshard, called \textit{the discrepancy} attack, which is the result of malicious nodes controlling a few subchains and dispersing different blocks to different nodes. We show that this attack undermines the security of Polyshard and is undetectable in its current setting.
翻译:将矿工或验证器分割成平行地形成和运行多个子链,被称为是块链伸缩问题的主要解决办法之一。 缺点是,随着每个子链扩展的矿工人数变得小,它很容易受到安全攻击。 为了解决这个问题,提议了一个称为\ textit{Ployshard}的框架,让每个验证器核查不同子链引入的区块的编码组合,从而帮助保护所有子链的安全。 在本文中,我们引入了对普洛伊沙德的攻击,称为\textit{The conference} attack,这是恶意节点控制了几个子链并将不同的区块分散到不同的节点的结果。 我们表明,这一攻击破坏了Polyshard的安全, 并且在当前环境中是无法察觉的。