In this paper, we develop a new methodology to provide high assurance about privacy in Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS). Our focus lies on vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications enabled by Cooperative Awareness Basic Service. Our research motivation is developed based on the analysis of unlinkability provision methods indicating a gap. To address this, we propose a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to express unlinkability for the situation where two cars are communicating with a Roadside Unit (RSU) using Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs). Our HMM has labeled states specifying distinct origins of the CAMs observable by a passive attacker. We then demonstrate that a high assurance about the degree of uncertainty (e.g., entropy) about labeled states can be obtained for the attacker under the assumption that he knows actual positions of the vehicles (e.g., hidden states in HMM). We further demonstrate how unlinkability can be increased in C-ITS: we propose a joint probability distribution that both drivers must use to obfuscate their actual data jointly. This obfuscated data is then encapsulated in their CAMs. Finally, our findings are incorporated into an obfuscation algorithm whose complexity is linear in the number of discrete time steps in HMM.
翻译:在本文中,我们开发了一种新的方法,对合作智能运输系统(C-ITS)的隐私提供高度的保证。我们的重点是由合作意识基础服务促成的车辆到所有通信(V2X),我们的研究动力是在分析显示差距的不连接提供方法的基础上开发的。为解决这一问题,我们提议了一个隐藏的Markov模型(HMM),以表达两辆汽车使用合作意识信息与路边单位(RSU)通信的不连接性。我们HMM已经标出两个州,指明了被动攻击者观测到的CAM的不同来源。我们随后表明,在假定攻击者了解车辆的实际位置(例如HMM公司隐藏的状态)的情况下,可以获得对标记状态的不确定性程度(例如,加密)的高度保证。我们进一步表明,C-ITS中如何增加不连接性:我们提议一种共同的概率分布,这两个司机必须用来共同混淆其实际数据的来源。这一令人困惑的数据在CAM号中,其复杂程度最终被嵌入了CAM号中。