As industry moves toward chiplet-based designs, the insertion of hardware Trojans poses a significant threat to the security of these systems. These systems rely heavily on cache coherence for coherent data communication, making coherence an attractive target. Critically, unlike prior work, which focuses only on malicious packet modifications, a Trojan attack that exploits coherence can modify data in memory that was never touched and is not owned by the chiplet which contains the Trojan. Further, the Trojan need not even be physically between the victim and the memory controller to attack the victim's memory transactions. Here, we explore the fundamental attack vectors possible in chiplet-based systems and provide an example Trojan implementation capable of directly modifying victim data in memory. This work aims to highlight the need for developing mechanisms that can protect and secure the coherence scheme from these forms of attacks.
翻译:随着行业转向基于芯片的设计,插入硬件Trojans对这些系统的安全构成了重大威胁。这些系统严重依赖缓存一致性来进行连贯的数据通信,使一致性成为一个吸引人的目标。 与以往的工作不同,以往的工作只侧重于恶意包装的修改,而利用一致性的Trojan攻击可以修改记忆中从未被触动过且不属于包含Trojan的芯片的数据。此外,Trojan甚至不需要在受害者和记忆控制器之间实际操作来攻击受害者的记忆交易。在这里,我们探索芯片系统中可能存在的基本攻击矢量,并提供能够直接修改受害者记忆中数据的特罗扬执行范例。 这项工作旨在强调建立能够保护和确保一致性机制免遭这些形式袭击的必要性。