Multi-agent systems often communicate over low-power shared wireless networks in unlicensed spectrum, prone to denial-of-service attacks. We consider the following scenario: multiple pairs of agents communicating strategically over shared communication networks in the presence of a jammer who may launch a denial-of-service. We cast this problem as a game between a coordinator who optimizes the transmission and estimation policies jointly and a jammer who optimizes its probability of performing an attack. We consider two cases: point-to-point channels and large-scale networks with a countably infinite number of sensor-receiver pairs. When the jammer proactively attacks the channel, the game is nonconvex from the coordinator's perspective. However, despite the lack of convexity, we construct a saddle point equilibrium solution for any multi-variate Gaussian distribution for the observations. When the jammer is reactive, we obtain an algorithm based on sequential convex optimization, which converges swiftly to first-order Nash-equilibria. Interestingly, blocking the channel is often optimal when the jammer is reactive, even when it is idle, to create ambiguity at the receiver.
翻译:多试剂系统经常在无证频谱下交流低功率共享无线网络,容易发生拒绝服务的攻击。我们考虑了以下情景:在可能启动拒绝服务的干扰器面前,多对代理人战略性地在共享通信网络上进行交流;我们把这个问题作为协调者优化传输和估算政策,与干扰者优化其实施袭击的可能性之间的游戏。我们考虑了两个案例:点对点频道和大型网络,其传感器接收器数量极小。当干扰器积极主动地攻击该频道时,游戏从协调员的角度来说是非convex的。然而,尽管缺乏凝固性,我们还是为任何多变量高斯的观测分布设计了一个马鞍平衡解决方案。当干扰器处于被动反应状态时,我们获得了基于连续连接优化的算法,该算法迅速与一级Nash-quilibria相融合。有趣的是,当干扰器反应时,即使处于空闲状态,阻断的通道往往最合适,在接收器上造成模糊性。</s>