According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing strategy. But this information is not always accurate. To avoid ambiguity a learner may therefore decide to collect a more reliable statistics by averaging the payoff values of its opponents in the neighborhood, and makes a decision afterwards. This simple alteration of the standard microscopic protocol significantly improves the cooperation level in a population. Furthermore, the positive impact can be strengthened by increasing the role of the environment and the size of the evaluation circle. The mechanism that explains this improvement is based on a self-organizing process which reveals the detrimental consequence of defector aggregation that remains partly hidden during face-to-face comparisons. Notably, the reported phenomenon is not limited to lattice populations but remains valid also for systems described by irregular interaction networks.
翻译:根据进化游戏理论的根本原则,在人口中,较为成功的策略应该传播。因此,在战略仿照过程中,玩家应该将其回报值与相竞策略所持有的回报值进行比较。但是,这一信息并不总是准确的。为了避免模糊,学习者可能因此决定收集更可靠的统计数据,办法是平均其周边对手的回报值,然后作出决定。这种简单的对标准微观协议的修改极大地提高了人口的合作水平。此外,通过增加环境的作用和评估圈的规模,可以加强积极的影响。解释这一改进的机制是基于一个自我组织的过程,它揭示了在面对面比较中部分隐藏的叛逃或合并的有害后果。值得注意的是,所报告的现象并不局限于拉蒂克人口,而且对于非正规互动网络描述的系统来说仍然有效。