不确定需求下的拉动式合约拍卖协商机制研究

项目名称： 不确定需求下的拉动式合约拍卖协商机制研究

项目编号： No.71471105

项目类型： 面上项目

立项/批准年度： 2015

项目学科： 管理科学

项目作者： 丁黎黎

作者单位： 山东科技大学

项目金额： 61万元

中文摘要： 以需求为导向的采购模式兴起，冲击了传统采购拍卖中关于采购数量固定不变的假设，本项目则将采购数量转化为一种内生变量，研究需求不确定下的拉动式合约拍卖协商机制问题，推动拍卖理论与供应链管理理论的融合。首先针对随机需求情形，扩展已有研究合约完备性假设，将合约的不确定性引入到拍卖协商机制设计中，从机制设计的角度来解决合约的不完备性问题；其次，针对需求统计信息不可得的占线情形，采用占线算法与竞争分析理论设计一种拉动式合约的占线拍卖协商机制，克服传统优化方法需概率假设的不足；第三，针对需求统计信息部分可得的占线情形，允许供应商具有非概率意义上的信息估计能力，构建风险补偿分析框架，在此框架下进行拉动式合约的拍卖协商机制研究。最后通过实证分析和数值模拟对所提出的模型和机制进行必要的变形和修正，使机制最终能得以实施和推广。

中文关键词： 占线；竞争策略；拍卖理论；竞争分析；不确定性决策

英文摘要： With the development of demand-oriented procurement, the assumption about fixed quantities in the traditional procurement auction problem seems inappropriate. This project studies a pull contract auction negotiation under uncertain demand when the procurement quantities are endogenous variables. It is to hope to combine the auction theory with supply chain theory. Firstly, in the case that the demand is stochastic, we consider an incomplete pull contract in the auction negotiation mechanism, which extends the original research based on the complete contract. Secondly, when the demand is on-line, which means the supplier has no information about the demand, we use the on-line algorithm and competitive analysis to design the auction negotiation mechanism. Thirdly, we extend the studies about the on-line cases and assume that the supplier has partial information about demand. The risk-reward framework is presented in auction negotiation mechanism. Finally, the empirical analysis and numerical simulations are presented to revise and replenish the models or mechanisms for the application in reality.

英文关键词： on-line;competitive strategy;auction theory;competitive analysis;uncertainty decision