Protecting secrets is a key challenge in our contemporary information-based era. In common situations, however, revealing secrets appears unavoidable, for instance, when identifying oneself in a bank to retrieve money. In turn, this may have highly undesirable consequences in the unlikely, yet not unrealistic, case where the bank's security gets compromised. This naturally raises the question of whether disclosing secrets is fundamentally necessary for identifying oneself, or more generally for proving a statement to be correct. Developments in computer science provide an elegant solution via the concept of zero-knowledge proofs: a prover can convince a verifier of the validity of a certain statement without facilitating the elaboration of a proof at all. In this work, we report the experimental realisation of such a zero-knowledge protocol involving two separated verifier-prover pairs. Security is enforced via the physical principle of special relativity, and no computational assumption (such as the existence of one-way functions) is required. Our implementation exclusively relies on off-the-shelf equipment and works at both short (60 m) and long distances ($\geqslant$400 m) in about one second. This demonstrates the practical potential of multi-prover zero-knowledge protocols, promising for identification tasks and blockchain applications such as cryptocurrencies or smart contracts.
翻译:保护秘密是我们当代基于信息的时代的一个关键挑战。然而,在常见情况下,披露秘密似乎不可避免,例如,在银行内部为取回资金而确认自己的身份时。反过来,在银行安全受到损害的情况下,这可能会对银行安全受到损害的不大可能但并非不切实际的情况产生非常不可取的后果。这自然提出了披露秘密是否从根本上是确定自己身份所必要的问题,还是更一般地证明声明正确性更普遍地说,计算机科学的发展通过零知识证明的概念提供了优雅的解决办法:证明人可以说服验证人核实某一声明的有效性,而完全不为拟订证据提供便利。在这项工作中,我们报告试验实现这种零知识协议的情况,涉及两个分离的验证人-采购人对口。安全是通过特别相对性的实际原则强制执行的,不需要计算假设(例如单向功能的存在)。我们的实施完全依靠现成的设备和工程,在短(60米)和长距离(egeqlant$400m)之间,在大约一秒钟内就能够实际实现这种智能链式协议。这显示了将可实现的连锁协议的可能性。