In this work we identify scanning strategies of IPv6 scanners on the Internet. We offer a unique perspective on the behavior of IPv6 scanners by conducting controlled experiments leveraging a large and unused /56 IPv6 subnet. We selectively make parts of the subnet visible to scanners by hosting applications that make direct or indirect contact with IPv6- capable servers on the Internet. By careful experiment design, we mitigate the effects of hidden variables on scans sent to our /56 subnet and establish causal relationships between IPv6 host activity types and the scanner attention they evoke. We show that IPv6 host activities e.g., Web browsing, membership in the NTP pool and Tor network, cause scanners to send a magnitude higher number of unsolicited IP scans and reverse DNS queries to our subnet than before. DNS scanners focus their scans in narrow regions of the address space where our applications are hosted whereas IP scanners broadly scan the entire subnet. Even after the host activity from our subnet subsides, we observe persistent residual scanning to portions of the address space that previously hosted applications
翻译:在这项工作中,我们确定互联网上IPv6扫描仪的扫描策略。我们通过利用大型和未使用的 56/ IPv6 子网进行控制实验,对 IPv6 扫描仪的行为提供了独特的视角。我们有选择地通过托管与互联网上具有IPv6 功能的服务器直接或间接接触的应用软件,使扫描器能够看到子网的一部分。通过仔细的实验设计,我们减轻隐藏变量对发送到我们的 56/ 子网的扫描器的影响,并在IPv6 主机活动类型和它们唤起的扫描器注意之间建立因果关系。我们显示,IPv6 主机活动,例如网络浏览、NTP 池和 Tor 网络的成员,使得扫描器比以前向我们的子网发送大量未经请求的 IP 扫描和反向 DNS 查询。 DNS 扫描器的扫描集中在我们应用程序所在地址空间的狭窄区域,而IP 扫描器则广泛扫描整个子网。即使从我们的子网子侧端的东道活动之后,我们也观察到对部分地址空间进行持续的残余扫描。