In its pragmatic turn, the new discipline of AI ethics came to be dominated by humanity's collective fear of its creatures, as reflected in an extensive and perennially popular literary tradition. Dr. Frankenstein's monster in the novel by Mary Shelley rising against its creator; the unorthodox golem in H. Leivick's 1920 play going on a rampage; the rebellious robots of Karel \v{C}apek -- these and hundreds of other examples of the genre are the background against which the preoccupation of AI ethics with preventing robots from behaving badly towards people is best understood. In each of these three fictional cases (as well as in many others), the miserable artificial creature -- mercilessly exploited, or cornered by a murderous mob, and driven to violence in self-defense -- has its author's sympathy. In real life, with very few exceptions, things are different: theorists working on the ethics of AI completely ignore the possibility of robots needing protection from their creators. The present book chapter takes up this, less commonly considered, ethical angle of AI.
翻译:在务实的转折中,AI伦理的新纪律被人类对其生物的集体恐惧所支配,这反映在广泛和常年流行的文学传统中。弗兰肯斯坦博士在Mary Shelley小说中的怪兽在Mary Shelley的《小说》中针对其创作者而崛起;H. Leivick 1920年非正统的歌莱姆剧在狂野中演戏;Karel\v{C}pek的叛逆机器人;Karel\v{C}pek的这些和其他数百个同类的叛逆机器人,是大赦国际道德关注防止机器人对人作恶行的背景,最能被人们所理解的背景。在这三个虚构案例(以及许多其他案例)中,每一起,悲惨的人工生物 -- -- 被残忍地剥削,或被谋杀暴徒所包围,在自卫中受到暴力的驱使 -- -- 都有作者的同情。在现实生活中,除了极少数例外,事情是不同的:从事AI伦理学的理论者完全忽视了机器人需要其创造者保护的可能性。本书章采纳了AI的道德角度,但通常不那么普遍考虑的这一角度。</s>