We set out to understand the effects of differing language on the ability of cybercriminals to navigate webmail accounts and locate sensitive information in them. To this end, we configured thirty Gmail honeypot accounts with English, Romanian, and Greek language settings. We populated the accounts with email messages in those languages by subscribing them to selected online newsletters. We hid email messages about fake bank accounts in fifteen of the accounts to mimic real-world webmail users that sometimes store sensitive information in their accounts. We then leaked credentials to the honey accounts via paste sites on the Surface Web and the Dark Web, and collected data for fifteen days. Our statistical analyses on the data show that cybercriminals are more likely to discover sensitive information (bank account information) in the Greek accounts than the remaining accounts, contrary to the expectation that Greek ought to constitute a barrier to the understanding of non-Greek visitors to the Greek accounts. We also extracted the important words among the emails that cybercriminals accessed (as an approximation of the keywords that they searched for within the honey accounts), and found that financial terms featured among the top words. In summary, we show that language plays a significant role in the ability of cybercriminals to access sensitive information hidden in compromised webmail accounts.
翻译:我们准备了解不同语言对网络罪犯浏览网络邮件账户和查找其中敏感信息的能力的影响。 为此,我们配置了30个Gmail 蜂蜜池账户,以英语、罗马尼亚语和希腊语设置。我们通过将这些语言的电子邮件信息加入选定的在线通讯,将这些账户中的电子邮件信息包含在这些语言中。我们在15个账户中隐藏了关于假银行账户的电子邮件信息,模仿真实世界的网络邮件用户,这些用户有时在他们的账户中储存敏感信息。我们随后通过表面网络和黑暗网络的粘贴网站向蜂蜜账户泄露了证书,并收集了15天的数据。我们对数据进行统计分析后发现,在希腊账户中发现敏感信息(银行账户信息)的可能性大于剩余账户,这与希腊人对希腊账户中非希腊裔访问者的理解障碍的预期相反。我们还提取了网络罪犯访问的电子邮件中的重要词(作为他们在蜂蜜账户中搜索的关键词的近似),并发现,金融术语是头几个字。简而言,我们显示,语言在隐藏的网络犯罪信息获取能力中起着重大敏感作用。