Finding equilibria points in continuous minimax games has become a key problem within machine learning, in part due to its connection to the training of generative adversarial networks. Because of existence and robustness issues, recent developments have shifted from pure equilibria to focusing on mixed equilibria points. In this note we consider a method proposed by Domingo-Enrich et al. for finding mixed equilibria in two-layer zero-sum games. The method is based on entropic regularisation and the two competing strategies are represented by two sets of interacting particles. We show that the sequence of empirical measures of the particle system satisfies a large deviation principle as the number of particles grows to infinity, and how this implies convergence of the empirical measure and the associated Nikaid\^o-Isoda error, complementing existing law of large numbers results.
翻译:在连续的微型游戏中找到平衡点已成为机器学习中的一个关键问题,部分原因是它与基因对抗网络的培训有关。由于存在和稳健问题,最近的事态发展已经从纯平衡问题转向了混合平衡点。在本说明中,我们考虑了Domingo-Enrich等人提出的在两层零和游戏中找到混合平衡的方法。该方法基于对热带的常规化,两种相互竞争的战略由两组互动粒子所代表。我们表明,粒子系统的经验性措施的顺序满足了随着粒子数量增长至无限而出现的巨大偏差原则,以及这意味着实验性措施与相关的Nikaidção-Isoda错误的趋同,从而补充了现有大量结果法则。