Android is present in more than 85% of mobile devices, making it a prime target for malware. Malicious code is becoming increasingly sophisticated and relies on logic bombs to hide itself from dynamic analysis. In this paper, we perform a large scale study of TSOPEN, our open-source implementation of the state-of-the-art static logic bomb scanner TRIGGERSCOPE, on more than 500k Android applications. Results indicate that the approach scales. Moreover, we investigate the discrepancies and show that the approach can reach a very low false-positive rate, 0.3%, but at a particular cost, e.g., removing 90% of sensitive methods. Therefore, it might not be realistic to rely on such an approach to automatically detect all logic bombs in large datasets. However, it could be used to speed up the location of malicious code, for instance, while reverse engineering applications. We also present TRIGDB a database of 68 Android applications containing trigger-based behavior as a ground-truth to the research community.
翻译:超过85%的移动设备中都存在机器人,这使得它成为恶意软件的首要目标。 恶意代码正在变得越来越复杂,并依靠逻辑炸弹来躲避动态分析。 在本文中,我们对TSOPEN进行了大规模研究,这是我们在500k Android应用中使用最先进的静态逻辑炸弹扫描器TRIGGERSCOPE的开放源头。结果显示该方法的规模。此外,我们调查了这些差异,并表明该方法可以达到非常低的假阳性率,0.3%,但成本特别高,例如,消除90%的敏感方法。因此,依靠这种方法自动检测大型数据集中的所有逻辑炸弹可能不现实。然而,它可以用来加速恶意代码的位置,比如,在反向工程应用中。我们还向研究界展示了TRIGDB一个包含触发行为68个机器人应用数据库。