Third-party dongles for cars, e.g. from insurance companies, can extract sensitive data and even send commands to the car via the standardized OBD-II interface. Due to the lack of message authentication mechanisms, this leads to major security vulnerabilities for example regarding the connection with malicious devices. Therefore, we apply a modular, protocol-independent firewall approach by placing a man-in-the-middle between the third-party dongle and the car's OBD-II interface. With this privileged network position, we demonstrate how the data flow accessible through the OBD-II interface can be modified or restricted. We can modify the messages contents or delay the arrival of messages by using our fine-granular configurable rewriting rules, specifically designed to work protocol agnostic. We have implemented our modular approach for a configurable firewall at the OBD-II interface and successfully tested it against third-party dongles available on the market. Thus, our approach enables a security layer to enhance automotive privacy and security of dongle users, which is of high relevance due to missing message authentications on the level of the electronic control units.
翻译:对于汽车,例如保险公司的第三方保险套可以提取敏感数据,甚至通过标准化 OBD-II 界面向汽车发送指令。由于缺乏信息认证机制,这导致了重大的安全弱点,例如恶意装置的连接。因此,我们采用了模块化的、协议独立的防火墙办法,在第三方保险套和汽车的OBD-II 界面之间设置一个中间点。有了这一特权网络位置,我们展示了如何修改或限制通过 OBD-II 界面获取的数据流。我们可以使用我们专门设计用于操作协议的精细的可配置配置改写规则来修改信息内容或延迟信息的到来。我们已经在OBD-II 界面上实施了可配置防火墙的模块化办法,并成功地对市场上可用的第三方保险套进行了测试。因此,我们的方法使得安全层能够加强通过 OBDD-II 界面的用户的汽车隐私和安全,由于电子控制单位级信息认证缺失而具有高度相关性。