We consider social welfare functions when the preferences of individual agents and society maximize subjective expected utility in the tradition of Savage. A system of axioms is introduced whose unique solution is the social welfare function that averages the agents' beliefs and sums up their utility functions, normalized to have the same range. The first distinguishing axiom requires positive association of society's preferences with the agents' preferences for acts about which beliefs agree. The second is a weakening of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives that only applies to non-redundant acts.
翻译:当个人代理人和社会的偏好在Savage传统中最大限度地提高主观预期效用时,我们考虑社会福利职能。我们引入了一种轴心制度,其独特的解决办法是社会福利职能,即平均代理人的信仰并总结其功用功能,使其正常化,使其具有相同的范围。第一个区别轴心要求社会偏好与代理人对信仰同意的行为的偏好积极挂钩。第二个是削弱箭头对适用于非累赘行为的不相干替代方案的独立性。