Recent research shows -- somewhat astonishingly -- that people are willing to ascribe moral blame to AI-driven systems when they cause harm [1]-[4]. In this paper, we explore the moral-psychological underpinnings of these findings. Our hypothesis was that the reason why people ascribe moral blame to AI systems is that they consider them capable of entertaining inculpating mental states (what is called mens rea in the law). To explore this hypothesis, we created a scenario in which an AI system runs a risk of poisoning people by using a novel type of fertilizer. Manipulating the computational (or quasi-cognitive) abilities of the AI system in a between-subjects design, we tested whether people's willingness to ascribe knowledge of a substantial risk of harm (i.e., recklessness) and blame to the AI system. Furthermore, we investigated whether the ascription of recklessness and blame to the AI system would influence the perceived blameworthiness of the system's user (or owner). In an experiment with 347 participants, we found (i) that people are willing to ascribe blame to AI systems in contexts of recklessness, (ii) that blame ascriptions depend strongly on the willingness to attribute recklessness and (iii) that the latter, in turn, depends on the perceived "cognitive" capacities of the system. Furthermore, our results suggest (iv) that the higher the computational sophistication of the AI system, the more blame is shifted from the human user to the AI system.
翻译:最近的研究显示 -- -- 有点令人惊讶的是 -- -- 人们愿意在AI驱动的系统造成伤害时将道德责任归咎于AI驱动的系统[1 -[4]]。在本文中,我们探讨了这些结果的道德心理基础。我们的假设是,人们把道德责任归咎于AI系统的理由是,他们认为他们有能力对精神状态(法律中称为 Mens rea )负罪责。为了探索这一假设,我们创造了这样一种情景,即AI系统在使用新型化肥时有可能给人们带来毒害的风险。在两个主题的设计中,我们探索了AI系统的计算(或准认知)能力。我们测试了人们是否愿意将重大伤害风险(即鲁莽)的知识归为AI系统的责任,并指责了AI系统的责任。此外,我们调查了对AI系统的轻率和指责是否影响人们所认为的系统用户(或所有者)的责任。我们发现,在与347名参与者的实验中,我们发现(i)人们愿意将AI系统的计算能力归罪于鲁莽的系统,我们是否愿意归罪于后者。