Many applications that benefit from data offload to cloud services operate on private data. A now-long line of work has shown that, even when data is offloaded in an encrypted form, an adversary can learn sensitive information by analyzing data access patterns. Existing techniques for oblivious data access--that protect against access pattern attacks--require a centralized, stateful and trusted, proxy to orchestrate data accesses from applications to cloud services. We show that, in failure-prone deployments, such a centralized and stateful proxy results in violation of oblivious data access security guarantees and/or system unavailability. Thus, we initiate the study of distributed, fault-tolerant, oblivious data access. We present SHORTSTACK, a distributed proxy architecture for oblivious data access in failure-prone deployments. SHORTSTACK achieves the classical obliviousness guarantee--access patterns observed by the adversary being independent of the input--even under a powerful passive persistent adversary that can force failure of arbitrary (bounded-sized) subset of proxy servers at arbitrary times. We also introduce a security model that enables studying oblivious data access with distributed, failure-prone, servers. We provide a formal proof that SHORTSTACK enables oblivious data access under this model, and show empirically that SHORTSTACK performance scales near-linearly with number of distributed proxy servers.
翻译:许多从数据上卸载数据到云层服务的应用都得益于私人数据。现在的一长串工作表明,即使数据以加密形式卸载,对手也可以通过分析数据访问模式来学习敏感信息。现有的隐蔽数据访问技术,可以防止访问模式攻击,需要一种集中、明确和可信赖的代用技术,以从云层服务应用程序中协调数据访问。我们显示,在易出故障的部署中,这种集中和状态的代理结果违反了模糊的数据访问安全保障和(或)系统无法获取。因此,我们开始研究分布式、不易出错、不易出错的数据访问。我们介绍了SHORTSTACK,这是在易出故障部署中可忽略数据访问的分布式代理结构。SHORSTC取得经典的隐蔽性保证-从云层访问模式,对手所观察到的这种模式独立于输入式的强大被动、持续的对立性对称,在任意的时候,可以强迫任意(受限制的)代用服务器的组合。我们还引入了一种安全模型,能够用模糊的、不易出错数据访问率的SHORS-SLS-SLSBSBSBSBS。