In this paper, we provide a novel dynamic decision method of blockchain selfish mining by applying the sensitivity-based optimization theory. Our aim is to find the optimal dynamic blockchain-pegged policy of the dishonest mining pool. To study the selfish mining attacks, two mining pools is designed by means of different competitive criterions, where the honest mining pool follows a two-block leading competitive criterion, while the dishonest mining pool follows a modification of two-block leading competitive criterion through using a blockchain-pegged policy. To find the optimal blockchain-pegged policy, we set up a policy-based continuous-time Markov process and analyze some key factors. Based on this, we discuss monotonicity and optimality of the long-run average profit with respect to the blockchain-pegged reward and prove the structure of the optimal blockchain-pegged policy. We hope the methodology and results derived in this paper can shed light on the dynamic decision research on the selfish mining attacks of blockchain selfish mining.
翻译:在本文中,我们通过应用基于敏感度的优化理论,提供了一种新颖的动态决定方法,用于隔离链自私采矿。我们的目标是找到不诚实的采矿池的最佳动态链条政策。为了研究自私的采矿攻击,两个采矿池的设计采用不同的竞争标准,诚实的采矿池采用两块领先的竞争标准,而不诚实的采矿池则采用一个封闭链条政策,修改两块领先的竞争标准。为了找到最佳的链条政策,我们建立了一个基于政策的连续时间马可夫进程,并分析一些关键因素。在此基础上,我们讨论了关于隔离链条奖励的长期平均利润的单调性和最佳性,并证明了最佳的链条政策的结构。我们希望,本文中得出的方法和结果能够说明关于阻链自私的采矿的自私攻击的动态决策研究。