Object detection plays a key role in many security-critical systems. Adversarial patch attacks, which are easy to implement in the physical world, pose a serious threat to state-of-the-art object detectors. Developing reliable defenses for object detectors against patch attacks is critical but severely understudied. In this paper, we propose Segment and Complete defense (SAC), a general framework for defending object detectors against patch attacks through detecting and removing adversarial patches. We first train a patch segmenter that outputs patch masks that provide pixel-level localization of adversarial patches. We then propose a self adversarial training algorithm to robustify the patch segmenter. In addition, we design a robust shape completion algorithm, which is guaranteed to remove the entire patch from the images given the outputs of the patch segmenter are within a certain Hamming distance of the ground-truth patch masks. Our experiments on COCO and xView datasets demonstrate that SAC achieves superior robustness even under strong adaptive attacks with no performance drop on clean images, and generalizes well to unseen patch shapes, attack budgets, and unseen attack methods. Furthermore, we present the APRICOT-Mask dataset, which augments the APRICOT dataset with pixel-level annotations of adversarial patches. We show SAC can significantly reduce the targeted attack success rate of physical patch attacks.
翻译:在许多安全关键系统中, 目标探测是关键。 反偏差攻击在物理世界中很容易执行, 严重威胁到最先进的物体探测器。 开发可靠的物体探测器防补补补丁袭击是关键, 但研究严重不足。 在本文中, 我们提议了部分和完整防御( SAC ), 通过探测和清除对立补丁, 保护物体探测器免遭补丁袭击的一般框架。 我们首先训练一个补丁段, 以补丁遮掩口罩, 提供像素级对抗补丁的本地化。 然后我们提出一个自我对抗性培训算法, 以强化补丁分层器。 此外, 我们设计一个强大的形状完成算法, 保证在补丁分仪输出后从图像中去除整个补丁。 我们的COCO 和 xVView 数据集实验显示, 即使在强的适应性攻击性攻击下, 也实现了超强的坚固性强性, 清洁图像上没有性下降, 普通化为看不见的补丁形状, 攻击预算, 和隐形攻击性攻击方法。 此外, 我们展示了SAROIC 目标攻击性攻击率数据,, 我们增加了SAPROC攻击率。