In this paper, we highlight scenarios in General Lotto games where there exist incentives to reveal one's intentions to an opponent. The General Lotto game is a popular model of competitive resource allocation. We study a multi-step extension where one player has the option to publicly pre-commit resources to battlefields before play begins. In response, the opponent decides which of these battlefields to secure by matching the pre-commitment with its own resources, and which of them to withdraw from entirely. They then engage in a General Lotto game over the remaining set of battlefields. We show that the weaker-resource player never has an incentive to pre-commit, while a stronger player can have incentives to pre-commit. However, this is not necessarily true in settings where the battlefield valuations are asymmetric across players. This setting is known to admit a richer set of outcomes, where multiple payoff-distinct equilibria can arise in simultaneous play. We show that pre-committing in this environment can guarantee a payoff that exceeds the second-highest equilibrium payoff from simultaneous play. Our work highlights the strategic role that revealing information plays can have in a variety of adversarial contexts.
翻译:在本文中,我们强调洛托将军游戏中存在向对手透露意图的激励因素的场景。 洛托将军游戏是竞争性资源分配的流行模式。 我们研究一个多步扩展, 玩家可以在游戏开始前公开向战场承诺资源。 作为回应, 对手决定这些战场的哪些是安全的, 方法是将承诺前的配对与自己的资源匹配, 哪些是完全退出的。 然后在剩下的一组战场上进行洛托将军游戏。 我们显示, 资源较弱的玩家从未有预先承诺的激励, 而更强的玩家可以有事先承诺的激励因素。 但是, 在战场估值对等的场景景中, 这一点不一定是真实的。 众所周知, 这种场景会同时产生一系列更丰富的结果, 多重的付款差异性松动可以同时产生。 我们显示, 在这种环境中进行预先承诺可以保证报酬超过第二高度的平衡回报。 我们的工作强调, 披露信息的战略作用可以在各种敌对背景下产生。