Kidney exchange programs (KEP's) represent an additional possibility of transplant for patients suffering from end stage kidney disease. If a patient has a willing living donor with whom the patient is not compatible, the pair patient--donor can join a pool of incompatible pairs and, if compatibility between patient and donor in two our more pairs exists, organs can be exchanged between them. The problem can be modeled as an integer program that, in general, aims at finding the pairs that should be selected for transplant such that maximum number of transplants is performed. In this paper we consider that for each patient there may exist a preference order over the organs that he/she can receive, since a patient may be compatible with several donors but may have a better fit over some than over others. Under this setting, the aim is to find the maximum cardinality stable exchange, a solution where no blocking cycle exists. For this purpose we propose three novel integer programming models based on the well-known edge and cycle formulations. These formulations are adjusted for both finding stable and strongly stable exchanges under strict preferences and for the case when ties in preferences may exist. Furthermore, we study a situation when the stability requirement can be relaxed by addressing the trade-off between maximum cardinality versus number of blocking cycles allowed in a solution. The effectiveness of the proposed models is assessed through extensive computational experiments on a wide set of instances.
翻译:肾脏交换方案(KEP)代表了移植肾脏末期疾病患者的额外可能性。如果病人有一个愿意的活捐赠者,而病人与该病人不相容,那么对病人和捐赠者可以加入不兼容的一对,如果病人和捐献者在另外两对中的兼容性存在,则器官可以相互交换。问题可以模拟成一个整数方案,一般地说,其目的是寻找应选择的对口进行移植的对口,以便进行最大数量的移植。在这份文件中,我们认为,每个病人都可能有优待他/她可以接受的器官的订单,因为病人可能与几个捐赠者兼容,但可能比其他病人更适合。在这一背景下,目标是找到最大程度的基点稳定交换,在没有阻塞循环的情况下找到一种解决办法。为此,我们建议三个新的整数组合方案模式。这些公式经过调整,以在严格的优惠下找到稳定和牢固稳定的交换,并在可能存在优惠关系的情况下找到案件。此外,我们研究一个在最广泛的贸易周期和最广泛的试验周期中,可以灵活地评估一种稳定性模式。