The extensive use of smartphones and wearable devices has facilitated many useful applications. For example, with Global Positioning System (GPS)-equipped smart and wearable devices, many applications can gather, process, and share rich metadata, such as geolocation, trajectories, elevation, and time. For example, fitness applications, such as Runkeeper and Strava, utilize the information for activity tracking and have recently witnessed a boom in popularity. Those fitness tracker applications have their own web platforms and allow users to share activities on such platforms or even with other social network platforms. To preserve the privacy of users while allowing sharing, several of those platforms may allow users to disclose partial information, such as the elevation profile for an activity, which supposedly would not leak the location of the users. In this work, and as a cautionary tale, we create a proof of concept where we examine the extent to which elevation profiles can be used to predict the location of users. To tackle this problem, we devise three plausible threat settings under which the city or borough of the targets can be predicted. Those threat settings define the amount of information available to the adversary to launch the prediction attacks. Establishing that simple features of elevation profiles, e.g., spectral features, are insufficient, we devise both natural language processing (NLP)-inspired text-like representation and computer vision-inspired image-like representation of elevation profiles, and we convert the problem at hand into text and image classification problem. We use both traditional machine learning- and deep learning-based techniques and achieve a prediction success rate ranging from 59.59\% to 99.80\%. The findings are alarming, highlighting that sharing elevation information may have significant location privacy risks.
翻译:59. 例如,由于全球定位系统(GPS)装备了智能和可磨损设备,许多应用可以收集、处理和分享丰富的元数据,例如地理定位、轨迹、升降和时间。例如,Runtair和Strava等健身应用软件,利用升级信息进行活动跟踪,最近也见证了欢迎率的上升。这些健身跟踪应用程序有自己的网络平台,允许用户在这种平台上分享活动,甚至与其他传统社交网络平台分享。为了维护用户隐私,同时允许共享,其中一些平台可以允许用户披露部分的预测信息,例如某种活动升级配置,据称不会泄露用户的位置。在这项工作中,作为一个告诫性的故事,我们提供了一个概念的证明,让我们检查升级配置在多大程度上可以用来预测用户的位置。为了解决这个问题,我们设计了三种可靠的威胁环境,在这个环境中,我们可以预测目标的城市或深层次。这些威胁环境界定了从对目标的升级到启动预测攻击的升级信息的数量,例如,活动升级的配置信息配置情况,假定不会泄露用户的位置。 建立简单的信息特征,我们制作了升级的图像的升级图,我们制作的升级的文本的图像,可以用来显示。