The participation of third-party entities in the globalized semiconductor supply chain introduces potential security vulnerabilities, such as intellectual property piracy and hardware Trojan (HT) insertion. Graph neural networks (GNNs) have been employed to address various hardware security threats, owing to their superior performance on graph-structured data, such as circuits. However, GNNs are also susceptible to attacks. This work examines the use of GNNs for detecting hardware threats like HTs and their vulnerability to attacks. We present BadGNN, a backdoor attack on GNNs that can hide HTs and evade detection with a 100% success rate through minor circuit perturbations. Our findings highlight the need for further investigation into the security and robustness of GNNs before they can be safely used in security-critical applications.
翻译:全球化半导体供应链中的第三方实体参与引入了潜在的安全漏洞,例如知识产权盗窃和硬件木马(HT)插入。由于其在电路等图形结构数据上具有卓越的性能,图神经网络(GNN)已被用于解决各种硬件安全威胁。然而,GNN也容易受到攻击。本文考察了使用GNN检测像HT这样的硬件威胁及其易受攻击的情况。我们提出了BadGNN,一种对GNN的后门攻击,它可以通过轻微的电路扰动隐藏HT并以100%的成功率逃避检测。我们的发现强调了在GNN可以安全地用于安全关键应用程序之前,需要进一步研究GNN的安全性和鲁棒性。