It is common to make a distinction between "strategic" behavior and other forms of intentional but "nonstrategic" behavior: typically, that strategic agents model other agents while nonstrategic agents do not. However, a crisp boundary between these concepts has proven elusive. This problem is pervasive throughout the game theoretic literature on bounded rationality and particularly critical in parts of the behavioral game theory literature that make an explicit distinction between the behavior of "nonstrategic" level-0 agents and "strategic" higher-level agents (e.g., the level-k and cognitive hierarchy models). Overall, work discussing bounded rationality rarely gives clear guidance on how the rationality of nonstrategic agents must be bounded, instead typically just singling out specific decision rules (e.g., randomizing uniformly, playing toward the best case, optimizing the worst case) and informally asserting that they are nonstrategic. In this work, we propose a new, formal characterization of nonstrategic behavior. Our main contribution is to show that it satisfies two properties: (1) it is general enough to capture all purportedly "nonstrategic" decision rules of which we are aware in the behavioral game theory literature; (2) behavior that obeys our characterization is distinct from strategic behavior in a precise sense.
翻译:通常的做法是区分“ 战略” 行为和其他形式故意的但“ 非战略”行为: 通常, 战略代理人模拟其他代理人, 而非战略代理人则不这样做。 但是, 这些概念之间的明确界限被证明是难以捉摸的。 这个问题在整个游戏理论文献中广泛存在, 特别是在行为游戏理论文献中的某些部分, 明确区分“ 非战略”0级代理人和“ 战略” 高级代理人的行为( 例如, 水平和认知等级模式) 。 总体而言, 讨论约束性合理性的工作很少明确指导非战略代理人的合理性必须如何受约束, 而通常只是挑出具体的决定规则( 例如, 统一随机化, 处理最佳案例, 优化最坏的案例), 并非正式地断言这些规则是非战略性的。 在这项工作中, 我们对非战略行为提出一个新的正式的定性。 我们的主要贡献是表明它满足了两种特性:(1) 它很笼统地反映了所有所谓的“ 非战略” 决策规则, 我们在行为游戏理论学说中意识到的是, 行为是截然不同的。