Are intelligent machines really intelligent? Is the underlying philosophical concept of intelligence satisfactory for describing how the present systems work? Is understanding a necessary and sufficient condition for intelligence? If a machine could understand, should we attribute subjectivity to it? This paper addresses the problem of deciding whether the so-called "intelligent machines" are capable of understanding, instead of merely processing signs. It deals with the relationship between syntaxis and semantics. The main thesis concerns the inevitability of semantics for any discussion about the possibility of building conscious machines, condensed into the following two tenets: "If a machine is capable of understanding (in the strong sense), then it must be capable of combining rules and intuitions"; "If semantics cannot be reduced to syntaxis, then a machine cannot understand." Our conclusion states that it is not necessary to attribute understanding to a machine in order to explain its exhibited "intelligent" behavior; a merely syntactic and mechanistic approach to intelligence as a task-solving tool suffices to justify the range of operations that it can display in the current state of technological development.
翻译:智能机器是否真的具有智能智能? 智能机器是否在描述当前系统如何运作时能够令人满意? 理解一个必要和足够的情报条件吗? 如果机器能够理解,我们是否应该将主观性赋予它? 本文探讨决定所谓的“智能机器”是否能够理解而不是仅仅处理信号的问题。 它涉及语法和语义之间的关系。 主要论题涉及关于建立意识机器可能性的任何讨论的语义的不可避免性,它被浓缩成以下两个原则:“如果机器能够理解(强烈地),那么它必须能够将规则和直觉结合起来”; “如果语法不能简化为语法,那么机器就无法理解。” 我们的结论指出,没有必要将理解归属于机器来解释其展示的“智能”行为; 仅仅将智慧作为一种综合和机械作为任务解决工具,足以证明它在当前技术发展状态中能够显示的操作范围是合理的。