Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents from at most a single buyer: her payoffs converge to 0 as soon as a single buyer has bought information. By contrast, if the seller can also sell valueless tokens, there exists a ``prepay equilibrium'' where payment is extracted from all buyers before the information good is released. By exploiting resale possibilities, this prepay equilibrium gives the seller as high a payoff as she would achieve if resale were prohibited.
翻译：信息可以复制,因为它可以同时消费并出售给他人。我们研究转售如何影响分散的信息市场。我们发现,即使最初的卖方是一个信息垄断者,她最多也从一个买方那里获取非三重租金:只要一个买方购买了信息,她的付款就会达到零分。相反,如果卖方也可以出售无价值的标牌,则存在“预先平衡 ”, 在信息货物公布之前从所有买方那里提取付款。通过利用转售的可能性,这种预先支付平衡给卖方的回报是如果禁止转售,她所能达到的。
相关内容
微信扫码咨询专知VIP会员