Antisocial behavior can be contagious, spreading from individual to individual and rippling through social networks. Moreover, it can spread not only through third-party influence from observation, just like innovations or individual behavior do, but also through direct experience, via "pay-it-forward" retaliation. Here, we distinguish between the effects of observation and victimization for the contagion of antisocial behavior by analyzing large-scale digital-trace data. We study the spread of cheating in more than a million matches of an online multiplayer first-person shooter game, in which up to 100 players compete individually or in teams against strangers. We identify event sequences in which a player who observes or is killed by a certain number of cheaters starts cheating, and evaluate the extent to which these sequences would appear if we preserve the team and interaction structure but assume alternative gameplay scenarios. The results reveal that social contagion is only likely to exist for those who both observe and experience cheating, suggesting that third-party influence and "pay-it-forward" reciprocity interact positively. In addition, the effect is present only for those who both observe and experience more than once, suggesting that cheating is more likely to spread after repeated or multi-source exposure. Approaching online games as models of social systems, we use the findings to discuss strategies for targeted interventions to stem the spread of cheating and antisocial behavior more generally in online communities, schools, organizations, and sports.
翻译:反社会行为可能具有传染性,从个人到个人,并通过社交网络传播。此外,它不仅可以通过观察的第三方影响传播,就像创新或个人行为一样,也可以通过直接经验传播。在这里,我们通过分析大规模数字跟踪数据,区分观察和受害对反社会行为蔓延的影响,我们研究在超过100万场网上多人第一手射击游戏中传播欺骗行为,其中多达100名玩家单独或团队与陌生人竞争。我们确定一个观察者或被某些作弊者杀害的玩家开始作弊的事件序列,并评估如果我们保留团队和互动结构,但采取替代游戏情景,这些序列将在多大程度上出现。结果显示,社会传染只可能存在于那些既观察又体验欺骗的人身上,表明第三方的影响和“付酬”对等对等行为是积极的。此外,这种效果只存在于那些观察和经验不止一次的人身上,我们发现或被某些作弊者开始作弊者开始作弊,并评估这些序列在多大程度上会出现这些序列,如果我们保存团队和互动结构,而采取替代游戏情景情景。结果显示,只有那些观察和经历欺骗行为的人才可能存在社会传播到更多的网络游戏模式。