The `Black Thursday' crisis in cryptocurrency markets demonstrated deleveraging risks in over-collateralized non-custodial stablecoins. We develop a stochastic model that helps explain deleveraging crises in these over-collateralized systems. In our model, the stablecoin supply is decided by speculators who optimize the profitability of a leveraged position while incorporating the forward-looking cost of collateral liquidations, which involves the endogenous price of the stablecoin. We formally characterize regimes that are interpreted as stable and unstable for the stablecoin. We prove bounds on quadratic variation and the probability of large deviations in the stable domain and we demonstrate distinctly greater price variance in the unstable domain. We identify a deflationary deleveraging spiral by means of a submartingale. These deleveraging spirals, which resemble short squeezes, lead to faster collateral drawdown (and potential shortfalls) and are accompanied by higher price variance, as experienced on Black Thursday. We conclude by discussing non-custodial ways in which the issues raised in this paper can be mitigated.
翻译:在加密货币市场上的“黑色星期四”危机表明,过度抵押的非拘禁稳定币的去杠杆化风险在过度抵押的非拘禁稳定币中的去杠杆化风险。我们开发了一个随机模型,帮助解释这些过度抵押的系统中的去杠杆化危机。在我们的模式中,稳定币供应是由投机者决定的,这些投机者优化了杠杆状态的利润,同时结合了抵押清算的前瞻性成本,这涉及到稳定币的内产价格。我们正式将被解释为稳定币的稳定和不稳定的制度定性为制度。我们证明,在稳定域中存在着二次变化和大规模偏差的可能性,我们在不稳定域中显示了明显更大的价格差异。我们发现,一种通缩式的去杠杆化螺旋式以亚平衡方式螺旋式螺旋式螺旋式螺旋式上升。这些与短期挤压相近,导致更快的抵押权缩减(和潜在短缺),并伴随着更高的价格差异,如黑色星期四所经历的那样。我们最后通过讨论非拘禁方式来减轻本文中提出的问题。我们最后通过讨论非拘禁方式来结束。