Ordinary and prophet planning under uncertainty in Bernoulli congestion games

We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player $i$ either participates in the game with an exogenous and known probability $p_{i}\in(0,1]$, independently of everybody else, or stays out and incurs no cost. We compute the parameterized price of anarchy to characterize the impact of demand uncertainty on the efficiency of selfish behavior, considering two different notions of a social planner. A prophet planner knows the realization of the random participation in the game; the ordinary planner does not. As a consequence, a prophet planner can compute an adaptive social optimum that selects different solutions depending on the players that turn out to be active, whereas an ordinary planner faces the same uncertainty as the players and can only compute social optima with respect to the player participation distribution. For both planners, we derive the precise price of anarchy, which arises from an optimization problem parameterized by the maximum participation probability $q=\max_{i} p_{i}$. For the case of affine costs, we provide an analytic expression for the ordinary and prophet price of anarchy, parameterized as a function of $q$.