Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are attractive for ride service providers (RSPs) in part because they eliminate the need to compete for human drivers. We investigate a scenario where two RSPs with AVs compete for customers. We model the problem as a game where the RSPs select prices for each origin-destination pair over multiple time periods in an underlying graph representing the customers' desired trips. Each RSP also decides the number of AVs to be stationed at each node at each time period to serve the customers' demands. The number of customers who avail of the service of an RSP depends on the price selected by the RSP and its competitor. Since the strategy choices available to an RSP depends on its competitor, we seek to compute a Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We show that there may be multiple GNEs. However, when an RSP selects prices in order to deter its competitor when it is not serving a source-destination pair, the game has a potential function and admits a unique GNE. We also compare the competitive prices with a monopoly price where only one RSP is in the market. Numerically, we show that if a network consists of two equal-size spatial clusters of demand where the demand between clusters is low, the RSPs may partition the market, i.e, one cluster is served by only one RSP. Hence, the competitive price may become close to the monopoly price.
翻译:自动车辆(AVs)对乘车服务提供者具有吸引力,部分原因是它们消除了对人驾驶员的竞争需求。我们调查了两个使用AVs的RSP公司竞争客户的情景。我们把问题模拟成一种游戏,在游戏中,RSP公司在多个时间里为每个来源目的地的双对选择价格,以代表客户希望的旅行。每个RSP公司还决定每个时间段在每个节点派驻的AV公司的数目,以满足客户的需求。利用RSP服务的客户人数取决于RSP及其竞争对手选择的价格。由于RSP公司可选择的策略取决于其竞争对手,我们试图在游戏中选择一个通用的纳什平衡(GNE) 。我们表明,可能存在多个GNENE,但是,当RSP公司选择价格是为了在不为源-目的地的一对一时,该游戏具有潜在的功能,并承认一个独特的GNE。我们还比较了竞争性价格,因为RSP公司所能选择的垄断价格与一个市场分组之间的价格,因此,我们只有NESP公司在其中一个市场中的一种市场分组中表现出了一种价格的平等。