Due to the nature of applications such as critical infrastructure and the Internet of Things etc. side channel analysis attacks are becoming a serious threat. Side channel analysis attacks take advantage from the fact that the behavior of crypto implementations can be observed and provides hints that simplify revealing keys. A new type of SCA are the so called horizontal SCAs. Well known randomization based countermeasures are effective means against vertical DPA attacks but they are not effective against horizontal DPA attacks. In this paper we investigate how the formula used to implement the multiplication of $GF(2^n)$-elements influences the results of horizontal DPA attacks against a Montgomery kP implementation. We implemented 5 designs with different partial multipliers, i.e. based on different multiplication formulae. We used two different technologies, i.e. a 130 and a 250 nm technology, to simulate power traces for our analysis. We show that the implemented multiplication formula influences the success of horizontal attacks significantly, but we also learned that its impact differs from technology to technology. Our analysis also reveals that the use of different multiplication formulae as the single countermeasure is not sufficient to protect cryptographic designs against horizontal DPA attacks.
翻译:由于关键基础设施和物的互联网等应用的性质,侧频道分析攻击正在成为一种严重威胁。侧频道分析攻击利用了可以观察到加密执行行为这一事实,并提供了简化显示钥匙的提示。一种新的SCA类型是所谓的横向SCA。众所周知,基于随机化的反措施是对抗政治部纵向攻击的有效手段,但对于政治部横向攻击并不有效。在本文件中,我们调查了用于实施美元(2 ⁇ )美元倍增的公式如何影响政治部对蒙哥马利 kP执行的横向攻击的结果。我们用不同的部分倍数,即不同倍数公式实施了5种设计。我们使用了两种不同的技术,即130和250纳米技术,以模拟我们分析的能量痕量。我们表明,执行的倍数公式对横向攻击的成功影响很大,但我们也了解到,其影响与技术不同。我们的分析还表明,使用不同的倍数公式作为单一反措施不足以保护对水平政治部攻击的加密设计。