Francis Bacon popularized the idea that science is based on a process of induction by which repeated observations are, in some unspecified way, generalized to theories based on the assumption that the future resembles the past. This idea was criticized by Hume and others as untenable leading to the famous problem of induction. It wasn't until the work of Karl Popper that this problem was solved, by demonstrating that induction is not the basis for science and that the development of scientific knowledge is instead based on the same principles as biological evolution. Today, machine learning is also taught as being rooted in induction from big data. Solomonoff induction implemented in an idealized Bayesian agent (Hutter's AIXI) is widely discussed and touted as a framework for understanding AI algorithms, even though real-world attempts to implement something like AIXI immediately encounter fatal problems. In this paper, we contrast frameworks based on induction with Donald T. Campbell's universal Darwinism. We show that most AI algorithms in use today can be understood as using an evolutionary trial and error process searching over a solution space. In this work we argue that a universal Darwinian framework provides a better foundation for understanding AI systems. Moreover, at a more meta level the process of development of all AI algorithms can be understood under the framework of universal Darwinism.
翻译:弗朗西斯· 培根(Francis 培根) 普及了这样的理念,即科学是基于一个感官过程,通过这个过程,反复的观察以某种未具体说明的方式被普遍化为基于未来与过去相似的假设的理论。这个理念被Hume和其他人批评为无法导致著名的感官问题。直到Karl Popper的工作才解决了这个问题,证明感官不是科学的基础,而科学知识的发展则基于与生物进化相同的原则。今天,机器学习还被教导为源于来自大数据的感官。Solomonoff感官在理想化的Bayesian代理(Hutter's AIXI)中实施的感化被广泛讨论,并被称作是理解AI算法的框架,尽管现实世界试图实施AIXI之类的事物,却立即遇到致命的问题。在本文中,我们与Donald T. Campbel的普世通用达尔文主义的感官框架对比了这一问题。我们表明,今天使用的大多数AI算术可以被理解为利用进化试验和错误过程来寻找解决办法空间。在这项工作中,我们认为一个普遍的达尔文框架提供了更好的基础,在更大程度上可以理解。