Credible equilibrium is a solution concept that imposes a stronger credibility notion than subgame perfect equilibrium. A credible equilibrium is a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium such that if a threat in a subgame g is "credible," then it must also be credible in every subgame g' that is "equivalent" to g. I show that (i) a credible equilibrium exists in multi-stage games, and (ii) if every stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then the credible equilibrium is unique even in infinite horizon multi-stage games. Moreover, in perfect information games, credible equilibrium is equivalent to subgame perfect equilibrium.
翻译：可信的平衡是一个解决方案概念,它比子游戏的完美平衡提出了更强的可信度概念。 可信的平衡是子游戏的完美平衡的完善,因此如果子游戏中的威胁是“可信的 ”, 那么它也必须在每一个“等同”的子游戏中都具有可信度。 我显示:(一) 多阶段游戏中存在可信的平衡,以及(二) 如果每个阶段游戏都有一个独特的纳什平衡,那么可靠的平衡就是唯一的。 此外,在完美的信息游戏中,可信的平衡也等同于子游戏的完美平衡。
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