In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider that the opponent's strategy is fixed while maximizing their payoff. The PPE, on the other hand, models the behavior of agents with an alternate form of rationality that involves a Stackelberg competition with the past. Agents with this form of rationality integrate in their reasoning that they have such accurate logical and predictive skills, that the world is fully transparent: all players share the same knowledge and know as much as an omniscient external observer. In particular, there is common knowledge of the solution of the game including the reached outcome and the thought process leading to it. The PPE is stable given each player's knowledge of its actual outcome and uses no assumptions at unreached nodes. This paper gives the general definition and construction of the PPE as a fixpoint problem, proves its existence, uniqueness and Pareto optimality, and presents two algorithms to compute it. Finally, the PPE is put in perspective with existing literature (Newcomb's Problem, Superrationality, Nash Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Backward Induction Paradox, Forward Induction).
翻译:本文在具有完美信息和严格偏好的有限游戏框架内,提出了一个新的平衡概念:完美的预测平衡(PPE)。在纳什范式中,理性球员认为对手的策略是固定的,同时最大限度地获得回报。而PPE则以另一种理性形式的代理人的行为为模型,与过去竞争史塔克尔堡。这种理性形式的代理人在其推理中结合了他们有准确的逻辑和预测技能,世界完全透明:所有球员都拥有相同的知识,并了解与无所不在的外部观察者一样多。特别是,人们普遍知道游戏的解决方法,包括达成的结果和导致结果的思考过程。PPPEP是稳定的,每个球员都了解其实际结果,并且不会在未触及的节点上使用任何假设。本文将PPE的一般定义和构建作为一个固定点问题,证明它的存在、独特性和最佳性,并且提出了两种对它进行修正的算法。最后,PPPPEPEPE具有对游戏解决办法的共同认识和了解,包括达成的结果和最终的思维过程。 PPEPEPE有共同的认识。鉴于每个玩者对它的实际结果的了解,没有任何假设上调,而现在的上调。