The security of models based on new architectures such as MLP-Mixer and ViTs needs to be studied urgently. However, most of the current researches are mainly aimed at the adversarial attack against ViTs, and there is still relatively little adversarial work on MLP-mixer. We propose an adversarial attack method against MLP-Mixer called Maxwell's demon Attack (MA). MA breaks the channel-mixing and token-mixing mechanism of MLP-Mixer by controlling the part input of MLP-Mixer's each Mixer layer, and disturbs MLP-Mixer to obtain the main information of images. Our method can mask the part input of the Mixer layer, avoid overfitting of the adversarial examples to the source model, and improve the transferability of cross-architecture. Extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness and superior performance of the proposed MA. Our method can be easily combined with existing methods and can improve the transferability by up to 38.0% on MLP-based ResMLP. Adversarial examples produced by our method on MLP-Mixer are able to exceed the transferability of adversarial examples produced using DenseNet against CNNs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first work to study adversarial transferability of MLP-Mixer.
翻译:需要紧急研究基于MLP-Mixer和ViT等新结构的模型的安全性,然而,目前大多数研究主要针对对ViTs的对抗性攻击,而对于MLP-Mixer的对抗性工作相对较少。我们提议对MLP-Mixer的称为Maxwell的恶魔攻击(MA)的MLP-Mixer采用对抗性攻击方法。MA通过控制MLP-Mixer的每个混合层部分输入,并扰乱MLP-Mixer获取图像主要信息的MLP-Mixer,打破了ML-Mix的频道混合和代号混合机制。我们的方法可以掩盖MLP-Mix的部分输入,避免将对抗性例子与源模型相配对,提高交叉结构的可转移性。广泛的实验性评估表明拟议的MA的有效性和优性表现。我们的方法可以很容易地与现有方法结合起来,并且可以改进MLP-ML-ResMLP-Misial-Mis的可转让性,我们制作的MMMix-Mlix-Dlix可转让性研究的可超越我们Mex-Mlix的可转让性研究方法的可复制性范例。