Designing auctions to incentivize buyers to invite new buyers via their social connections is a new trend in mechanism design. The challenge is that buyers are competitors and we need to design proper incentives for them to invite each other. For selling a single item, many interesting mechanisms have been proposed. However, all the mechanisms require the seller or a third party to be trustworthy to execute the mechanisms. In addition, the owner of the mechanism will know all the connections of the network after the execution, which poses a potential privacy issue. Hence, distributed mechanisms to avoid the privacy issue are more appealing in practice. Therefore, in this paper, we propose the first distributed mechanism in social networks without revealing buyers' private connections to anyone, and it achieves complete decentralization that does not rely on any trustworthy third party. Moreover, the centralized reduction of our mechanism also offers a novel way to compute players' contributions compared to the existing solutions.
翻译:设计拍卖以激励买主通过其社会联系邀请新买主是机制设计中的新趋势。 挑战在于买主是竞争者,我们需要设计适当的激励机制,让他们互相邀请。 对于出售一个单一的项目,已经提出了许多有趣的机制。然而,所有机制都要求卖主或第三方执行机制要可信。此外,机制所有人在实施后将了解网络的所有连接,这可能造成潜在的隐私问题。因此,在实际中,为避免隐私问题而分发的机制更具吸引力。因此,我们在本文件中提出社交网络中第一个分配的机制,而不向任何人披露买家的私人连接,它实现了完全的权力下放,而并不依赖任何可靠的第三方。此外,集中削减我们的机制也为计算参与者与现有解决方案相比的贡献提供了一种新的方式。</s>