项目名称: 考虑共谋行为的多属性采购拍卖理论与优化方法研究
项目编号: No.71471122
项目类型: 面上项目
立项/批准年度: 2015
项目学科: 管理科学
项目作者: 陈哲
作者单位: 四川大学
项目金额: 60万元
中文摘要: 多属性采购拍卖模型是多目标优化模型在经典拍卖理论中的重要应用和发展;而共谋行为是采购拍卖研究中的一个深刻而有趣的问题,它集中体现了投标者既竞争又合作的关系。本项目主要通过多目标优化相关理论,研究多属性采购拍卖中共谋行为的特征;共谋组织的稳定性;最优共谋机制,以及采购设计者如何应对共谋行为的负面影响等问题。具体研究内容如下:(1)、研究投标者与采购代理人之间的共谋行为,并分析这种特殊的共谋行为对采购结果的影响;(2)、研究投标者之间的共谋行为形成的特征,分析决策维度与共谋行为之间的关系以及共谋组织的稳定性;(3)、研究投标者最优共谋机制的特征,并分析这种机制的存在与稳定的充分必要条件,以及对采购者预期效用的影响;(4)、研究采购者如何通过优化采购机制设计应对投标者的共谋行为。本项目在理论上可以看作是对现有采购拍卖理论的发展和推广;在实践中可以为丰富和完善我国招投标相关制度法规提供理论支持。
中文关键词: 多目标优化;采购拍卖理论;共谋;机制设计;优化方法
英文摘要: The multidimensional procurement auction model is an important application and improvement of multiobjective optimization models in the classical auction theory, while collsion is a significant and interesting research topic in the study of procurement auction theory, and it embodies the cooperative and competitive relationships between bidders in procurement auctions. In this project, by virtue of multiobjective optimization theory, we will investigate the characterizations of collusions, the stability of collusive structures, the optimal collusive mechanism and how the procurement auction designers make response to the collusions. The details of the project are as follows: (1). we will consider the collusions between the bidders and the agent, and analyze that how the collusions affect the outcome of various multidimensional procurement auctions; (2). we will investigate the characterizations of the collusions, make analysis on the relationship between the decision dimensions and the collusions, and on the stability of the collusive structures in various multidimensional procurement auctions; (3). we will study the characterizations of a optimal collusion mechanism, and obtaim some necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and stability of the optimal collusion mechanism, and analyze how the the expected utility of the procurement auction designers is affected by the optimal collusion mechanism; (4). we will propose some responses made by the procurement auction designers to deal with the collusions via mechanism design. The outcomes of our project can not only be regarded as some improvements and generalizations of procurement auction theory, but also provide some academic supports for the rules of procurement auction practice in China.
英文关键词: multiobjective optimization;procurement auction theory;collusion;mechanism design;optimization method