Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process starting from the whole set of persons having passive electoral rights and even the aspect of reelection. By a new view on abstentions from voting and an adaption of Majority Judgement with three grades, we are able to describe a complete process for an election that can be easily put into legislation and sets suitable incentives for politicians who want to be reelected.
翻译:就像许多其他投票系统一样,Majority Judgement 遭受着基础数学模型的弱点:选举作为选择或排名问题。我们展示了如何增强模型,以考虑从拥有被动选举权利的所有人开始的完整过程,甚至考虑连任的方面。通过对弃权投票的新视角和对三个等级的 Majority Judgement 的调整,我们能够描述出一个完整的选举过程,该过程可以轻松地被制定为法律,并为希望连任的政治家设置合适的激励机制。