A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working increases the arrival rate of breakthroughs and decreases the arrival rate of breakdowns. To motivate the agent to work, the principal conducts costly inspections. She fires the agent if shirking is detected. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection policy. Periodic inspections are optimal if work primarily speeds up breakthroughs. Random inspections are optimal if work primarily delays breakdowns. Crucially, the agent's actions determine his risk-attitude over the timing of punishments.
翻译:一个负责人雇佣代理人参与一个长期项目,该项目最终会产生突破或崩溃。代理人在每个时刻都会私下选择工作或懒惰。工作会增加突破的到达速率并降低崩溃的到达速率。为了激励代理人工作,负责人会进行昂贵的检查。如果检测到懒惰行为,她会解雇代理人。我们表征了负责人的最优检查策略。如果工作主要加快突破的到达,则周期性检查最优。如果工作主要延迟崩溃的出现,则随机检查最优。至关重要的是,代理人的行动决定了他对惩罚时机的风险态度。