A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that takes as input an arbitrary string, i.e., a tag, is known as tag-KEM, while a scheme that combines signature and encryption is called signcryption. In this paper, we present a code-based signcryption tag-KEM scheme. We utilize a code-based signature and a CCA2 (adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) secure version of McEliece's {encryption} scheme. The proposed scheme uses an equivalent subcode as a public code for the receiver, making the NP-completeness of the equivalent subcode problem be one of our main security assumptions. We then base the signcryption tag-KEM to design a code-based hybrid signcryption scheme. A hybrid scheme deploys an asymmetric- as well as a symmetric-key encryption. We give security analyses of both our schemes in the standard model and prove that they are secure against IND-CCA2 (indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) and SUF-CMA (strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack).
翻译:将任意字符串( 即标签) 作为输入输入的关键封装机制 (KEM) 。 拟议的方案使用一个相当的子代码作为接收器的公共代码, 使相应的子代码问题的完整性成为我们的主要安全假设之一。 我们随后将基于代码的签名加密标记( KEM) 用于设计基于代码的混合签名加密方案。 混合方案部署一个基于代码的签名和密码的加密密码( 适应性选择的加密攻击) 。 我们用标准模型对我们的计划进行安全分析, 并证明它们对于IND- CCA2( 适应性选择的加密攻击下的可分解性) 和 SUF- CMA( 选择的进攻下的坚固的不加密) 安全性。