A distribution inference attack aims to infer statistical properties of data used to train machine learning models. These attacks are sometimes surprisingly potent, but the factors that impact distribution inference risk are not well understood and demonstrated attacks often rely on strong and unrealistic assumptions such as full knowledge of training environments even in supposedly black-box threat scenarios. To improve understanding of distribution inference risks, we develop a new black-box attack that even outperforms the best known white-box attack in most settings. Using this new attack, we evaluate distribution inference risk while relaxing a variety of assumptions about the adversary's knowledge under black-box access, like known model architectures and label-only access. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of previously proposed defenses and introduce new defenses. We find that although noise-based defenses appear to be ineffective, a simple re-sampling defense can be highly effective. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/dissecting_distribution_inference
翻译:分布式推论攻击旨在推断用于培训机器学习模型的数据的统计特性。这些攻击有时是惊人的,但影响分布式推论风险的因素没有很好地理解和证明的攻击往往依赖强而不现实的假设,例如即使在假定的黑箱威胁情景中也充分了解培训环境。为了提高对分布式推论风险的理解,我们开发了一种新的黑箱攻击,这种攻击在多数情况下甚至比最已知的白箱攻击效果还要高。我们利用这次新的攻击,评估分布式推论风险,同时在黑箱访问下放松对敌人知识的各种假设,如已知的模型结构和仅贴标签的准入。最后,我们评估了先前提出的防御措施的有效性,并引入了新的防御措施。我们发现,虽然噪音防御似乎无效,但简单的再抽样防御措施可以非常有效。代码可在https://github.com/iamgroot42/discovering_sulation_ination_inference查阅。