We examine behavior in a voluntary resource sharing game that incorporates endogenous network formation; an incentive problem that is increasingly common in contemporary digital economies. By varying the information structure in a controlled laboratory experiment, we examine the underlying mechanisms of reciprocity that generate emergent patterns in linking and contribution decisions. Specifically, we vary whether players are given information about which other players in their group are sharing with them. Reduced-form estimates find significant effects of this information treatment on a number of key outcomes such as efficiency and balanced decentralization. To further understand the driving causes of these observed changes in behavior, we develop and estimate a discrete-choice framework, using computationally efficient panel methods to identify the structure of social preferences in this setting. We find that subjects react to this new information by focusing reciprocity, which helps players coordinate to reach mutually beneficial outcomes. We also find that direct and indirect reciprocity are not perfect substitutes, and this interaction further helps players support efficient outcomes.
翻译:我们研究的是自愿资源共享游戏中的行为,该游戏包括了内生网络的形成;这是一个在当代数字经济中日益常见的激励问题。我们通过在受控实验室实验中改变信息结构,审视了在联系和贡献决定方面产生突发模式的互惠基本机制。具体地说,我们研究的是,是否向参与者提供了有关其集团中其他参与者与它们共享的信息。减少的表格估计发现,这种信息处理对于提高效率和平衡的权力下放等若干关键结果产生了重大影响。为了进一步理解这些观察到的行为变化的驱动因素,我们制定并估计了一个独立的选择框架,利用计算高效的小组方法来确定这一环境中的社会偏好结构。我们发现,主体通过注重互惠来对这种新信息作出反应,这有助于参与者协调实现互利结果。我们还发现,直接和间接互惠不是完美的替代品,这种互动进一步帮助参与者支持高效率的结果。