IPv6's large address space provides ample freedom for assigning addresses. To resist IP-based tracking, several techniques have been standardized to leverage this large address space, including privacy extensions and provider prefix rotation. Whereas in IPv4 many hosts may map to one address, e.g., with NAT, in IPv6 a single host may use many different public addresses. The use of many IPv6 addresses by a single host over time confounds not only adversarial tracking and traffic correlation attempts, but also traditional network measurements, logging, and defense mechanisms. We show that the intended anti-tracking capability of these widely deployed techniques is unwittingly subverted by edge routers that use legacy IPv6 addressing schemes with embedded unique identifiers. Via Internet-wide measurements, we find more than 9M affected customers across hundreds of networks worldwide. Using our technique, we demonstrate the ability of a passive adversary to correlate seemingly unrelated IPv6 traffic flows over time. Based on our findings, we contact equipment manufacturers and make recommendations to remediate this weaknesses in IPv6 infrastructure.
翻译:IPv6 的大型地址空间为指定地址提供了充足的自由。 为抵制基于 IP 的跟踪, 已经对一些技术进行了标准化, 以利用这个大型地址空间, 包括隐私扩展和供应商前缀旋转。 在 IPv4 中, 许多主机可以映射到一个地址, 例如 NAT, 在 IPv6 中, 单个主机可能使用许多不同的公共地址 。 单个主机使用许多 IPv6 地址, 不仅混淆了对立跟踪和交通相关尝试, 也混淆了传统的网络测量、 伐木和防御机制 。 我们显示, 这些广泛应用的技术的反跟踪能力被边缘路由器无意地破坏, 这些路由器使用嵌入独有识别器的遗留的 IPv6 IPv6 处理计划 。 在互联网上进行测量, 我们发现全世界数百个网络中有超过 9M 受到影响的客户 。 使用我们的技术, 我们展示了被动对手在一段时间内连接看起来不相连的 IPv6 交通流的能力 。 根据我们的发现, 我们联系设备制造商, 并提出建议来补救 IPv6 基础设施中的弱点 。