We propose Remote Attestation with TOCTOU Avoidance (RATA): a provably secure approach to address the RA TOCTOU problem. With RATA, even malware that erases itself before execution of the next RA, can not hide its ephemeral presence. RATA targets hybrid RA architectures (implemented as Hardware/Software co-designs), which are aimed at low-end embedded devices. We present two alternative techniques - RATAa and RATAb - suitable for devices with and without real-time clocks, respectively. Each is shown to be secure and accompanied by a publicly available and formally verified implementation. Our evaluation demonstrates low hardware overhead of both techniques. Compared with current RA architectures - that offer no TOCTOU protection - RATA incurs no extra runtime overhead. In fact, RATA substantially reduces computational costs of RA execution.
翻译:我们建议使用TOCTOU避免(RATA)进行远程检测:一种安全可靠的方法来解决RATOTOOU问题。使用RATA,即使是在下一个RA执行之前抹去自己的恶意软件,也不能掩盖其短暂存在。RATA针对的是混合RA结构(作为硬件/软件共同设计实施),这些结构针对的是低端嵌入装置。我们提出了两种替代技术:RATAa和RATAB,它们分别适合安装有实时时钟和没有实时时钟的装置。每种技术都证明是安全的,并配有公开可用和经正式核实的执行。我们的评估表明这两种技术的硬件间接损失都很低。与目前的RA结构相比,它们没有提供TOCTOU保护,ROTA没有额外的运行性管理。事实上,RATA大幅降低了RA执行的计算成本。