The increasing interaction of industrial control systems (ICSs) with public networks and digital devices introduces new cyber threats to power systems and other critical infrastructure. Recent cyber-physical attacks such as Stuxnet and Irongate revealed unexpected ICS vulnerabilities and a need for improved security measures. Intrusion detection systems constitute a key security technology, which typically monitor network data for detecting malicious activities. However, a central characteristic of modern ICSs is the increasing interdependency of physical and cyber network processes. Thus, the integration of network and physical process data is seen as a promising approach to improve predictability in intrusion detection for ICSs by accounting for physical constraints and underlying process patterns. This work systematically assesses real-time cyber-physical intrusion detection and multiclass classification, based on a comparison to its purely network data-based counterpart and evaluation of misclassifications and detection delay. Multiple supervised machine learning models are applied on a recent cyber-physical dataset, describing various cyber attacks and physical faults on a generic ICS. A key finding is that integration of physical process data improves detection and classification of all attack types. In addition, it enables simultaneous processing of attacks and faults, paving the way for holistic cross-domain cause analysis.
翻译:工业控制系统(ICS)与公共网络和数字装置之间日益增强的相互作用,给电力系统和其他关键基础设施带来了新的网络威胁; 诸如Stuxnet和铁门等最近的网络物理攻击暴露出ICS出乎意料的弱点,需要改进安全措施; 入侵探测系统是一种关键的安全技术,通常监测网络数据,以探测恶意活动; 然而,现代ICS的一个中心特征是物理和网络网络程序日益相互依存; 因此,将网络和物理过程数据结合起来被视为一种有希望的方法,通过计算物理限制和基本过程模式,提高ICS入侵探测的可预测性; 这项工作系统地评估实时网络物理入侵探测和多级分类,其依据是与其纯粹的网络数据对应方的比较以及对错误分类和检测延迟的评估; 多个受监督的机器学习模型用于最近的网络物理数据集,描述通用ICS的各种网络攻击和物理错误; 一项关键发现是,将物理过程数据整合可以改进所有攻击类型的探测和分类; 此外,它能够同时处理攻击和过失,为整体原因分析铺平路。