We present F-PKI, an enhancement to the HTTPS public-key infrastructure that gives trust flexibility to both clients and domain owners while giving certification authorities (CAs) means to enforce stronger security measures. In today's web PKI, all CAs are equally trusted, and security is defined by the weakest link. We address this problem by introducing trust flexibility in two dimensions: with F-PKI, each domain owner can define a domain policy (specifying, for example, which CAs are authorized to issue certificates for their domain name) and each client can set or choose a validation policy based on trust levels. F-PKI thus supports a property that is sorely needed in today's Internet: trust heterogeneity. Different parties can express different trust preferences while still being able to verify all certificates. In contrast, today's web PKI only allows clients to fully distrust suspicious/misbehaving CAs, which is likely to cause collateral damage in the form of legitimate certificates being rejected. Our contribution is to present a system that is backward compatible, provides sensible security properties to both clients and domain owners, ensures the verifiability of all certificates, and prevents downgrade attacks. Furthermore, F-PKI provides a ground for innovation, as it gives CAs an incentive to deploy new security measures to attract more customers, without having these measures undercut by vulnerable CAs.
翻译:我们提出了F-PKI,这是对HTTPS公用钥匙基础设施的一种加强,它使客户和域主都具有信任灵活性,同时给验证局提供执行更强有力的安全措施的手段。在今天的网络公用钥匙基础结构中,所有CA都同样可信,安全由最薄弱的链接来界定。我们通过在两个方面引入信任灵活性来解决这个问题:F-PKI,每个域主都可以确定一个域政策(例如,指明哪些CA被授权签发其域名证书),每个客户都可以根据信任程度制定或选择一项验证政策。F-PKI因此支持今天的互联网非常需要的财产:信任异质性。不同当事方可以表示不同的信任偏好,同时仍然能够核查所有证书。相比之下,今天的网络公用钥匙基础结构只允许客户完全不信任可疑/错误的CA,这可能造成合法证书被拒的附带损害。我们的贡献是提出一个落后的系统,向客户和域主提供合理的安全产权,确保所有证书的可核查性,并且通过安全性革新使客户获得新的措施。此外,FKI提供了一种新的安全措施。