The design of permissioned blockchains places an access control requirement for members to read, access, and write information over the blockchains. In this paper, we study a hierarchical scenario to include three types of participants: providers, collectors, and governors. To be specific, providers forward transactions, collected from terminals, to collectors; collectors upload received transactions to governors after verifying and labeling them; and governors validate a part of received labeled transactions, pack valid ones into a block, and append a new block on the ledger. Collectors in the hierarchical model play a crucial role in the design: they have connections with both providers and governors, and are responsible for collecting, verifying, and uploading transactions. However, collectors are rational and some of them may behave maliciously (not necessarily for their own benefits). In this paper, we introduce a reputation protocol as a measure of the reliability of collectors in the permissioned blockchain environment. Its objective is to encourage collectors to behave truthfully and, in addition, to reduce the verification cost. The verification cost on provider $p$ is defined as the total number of invalid transactions provided by $p$ and checked by governors. Through theoretical analysis, our protocol with the reputation mechanism has a significant improvement in efficiency. Specifically, the verification loss that governors suffer is proved to be asymptotically $O(\sqrt{T_{total}})$ ($T_{total}$, representing the number of transactions verified by governors and provided by $p$), as long as there exists at least one collector who behaves well. At last, two typical cases where our model can be well applied are also demonstrated.
翻译:获得许可的连锁链的设计为成员读取、访问和写入该连锁链的信息规定了访问控制要求。 在本文中,我们研究一种等级假设方案,包括三类参与者:提供者、收藏者和董事。 具体地说,提供者将交易从终端收集到收集到收藏者; 收藏者在核查和标签后上传交易给州长; 州长验证收到的标签交易的一部分, 将有效交易包装到一个区块, 并在分类簿上附加一个新的区块。 等级模型的收集者在设计中发挥着关键作用: 他们与提供者和董事都有联系, 并负责收集、核查和上传交易。 然而, 收藏者是理性的, 其中一些可能是恶意的( 不一定是为了其自身的利益)。 在本文件中, 我们引入了名谱协议, 以衡量收藏者在允许的连锁链环境中的可靠性。 目的是鼓励收藏者诚实地行事, 并且降低核查费用。 供应商的最后费用成本是: 他们与提供最低模式的交易总数, 美元,他们负责收集、核查和上传交易的总数。 通过理论分析, 证明我们的总交易是否可靠。