In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism that can truthfully implement it. This paper aims to propose a failure of the revelation principle. We point out that in any game the format of each agent's strategy is either an informational message or a realistic action, and the action format is very common in many practical cases. The main result is that: For any given social choice function, if the mechanism which implements it has action-format strategies, then "\emph{honest and obedient}" will not be the equilibrium of the corresponding direct mechanism. Consequently, the revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action.
翻译：在机制设计理论中,设计者希望执行一种社会选择功能,该功能为每一种可能的代理人私人类型配置提供她最喜欢的结果。 披露原则主张, 如果社会选择功能可以通过一个均衡的机制来实施, 那么就有一个直接的机制可以真正地实施它。 本文旨在提出披露原则的失败。 我们指出, 在任何游戏中,每个代理人战略的格式要么是信息信息,要么是现实的行动, 行动格式在许多实际情况下非常常见。 主要结果是: 对于任何特定的社会选择功能, 如果执行该功能的机制有行动格式的战略, 那么“ 诚实和服从” 将不是相应的直接机制的平衡。 因此, 当每个代理人战略的格式是行动时, 披露原则就会失败。
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